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ABSTRACT
New emerging and re-emerging threats, the weight of public opinion and new technology for
surveillance and treatment are likely to impact on how, and if, effective surveillance can be performed in
the future. If surveillance fails to address the needs of practitioners and policy-makers, it is likely that
there will be loss of conﬁdence. Current surveillance systems are reasonably effective at detecting
signiﬁcant events that are localised in time and space. It is more difﬁcult to detect diffuse and
progressive events with a slow increase over time or sporadic and widespread events without obvious
links to time, place or person. Detection of these events relies on good data collection, comparative
background data and sophisticated analytical tools. To improve surveillance systems, we need methods
with the appropriate sensitivity and speciﬁcity for the outputs desired. Targeted surveillance should
enable better ascertainment of those cases which must be considered and those which can be dismissed.
New methods, such as mathematical modelling and geographical information systems, support
conventional surveillance in moving events into the known and predictable category. It is important to
integrate surveillance across local, regional and international levels and to base surveillance on local
public health structures. The purpose and value of data aggregation at each level and the amount of
detail needed at each level must be carefully evaluated. The key to all these improvements is developing
the workforce. Surveillance needs individuals with a broad range of skills: clinical, epidemiological,
anthropological, and mathematical; in particular, people who can think laterally. These individuals must
be encouraged through effective training courses, good mentorship, networking and clear career
structures.
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INTRODUCTION
Surveillance is the cornerstone of an effective
response to the threat of infection. Infections result
from an interplay between a susceptible host, a
virulent organism and the environment that brings
them together. Failure to consider all of these
elements and how they interact will result in a less
than adequate response. Surveillance can provide
information on the changing burden of infectious
diseases, changes in the infecting agent (e.g., anti-
microbial resistance), and changes in environmen-
tal factors (such as behaviour, e.g., condom usage),
and thereby allow the timely recognition of emer-
ging threats and evaluation of interventions.
Effective surveillance should inform us about:
the infections that are themost important causes of
illness, disability and death, so that priorities can
be determined for control and prevention activit-
ies; those populations most affected, or at risk, so
that control and prevention efforts can be focused;
outbreaks or epidemics, so that immediate action
can be taken to identify and control the source;
likely demands on healthcare services; and the
effectiveness of control and prevention activities.
It should be clear from this that the data-
capturing and analysis components of surveil-
lance should be closely allied to control and
prevention measures. Surveillance helps identify
the appropriate measures and provides the means
to assess their efﬁcacy. Surveillance is a tool for
improving the prevention, treatment and control
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of infectious disease—it is not an end in itself.
Therefore, surveillance should be linked to out-
comes, and should have clear objectives.
Indeed, a criticism of some surveillance sys-
tems is that the rationale for the data collection is
not clear; the link between data collection and
control activities has not been made, or has not
been made explicitly. For many surveillance
systems, the outputs, in terms of data, tables,
newsletters, and websites, are often complex,
inappropriate for the guidance of action, inad-
equate or not timely enough. If healthcare systems
are to respond to future infectious disease threats,
surveillance systems must provide those respon-
sible for taking action with understandable,
timely information.
Surveillance data come from a variety of
sources, the main ones being: formal notiﬁcation,
by law—some diseases are ‘notiﬁable’, which
means that a doctor should report them on the
basis of the symptoms alone, rather than waiting
for laboratory conﬁrmation; laboratory reports;
and clinician reporting. For some diseases that are
of public health importance but not legally noti-
ﬁable, key items of information are requested by
public health authorities to ensure that appropri-
ate action can be taken.
Surveillance data are commonly aggregated
from local, through regional to national data sets.
Recognition of international threats to health and
increasing collaboration have driven the develop-
ment of international data sets. Careful consid-
eration must be given to the purpose and value of
data aggregation at each level, and therefore the
amount of detail that must be made available at
each level. This is likely to be condition-speciﬁc.
For many conditions, it is unlikely that individual
speciﬁc data will be required above the local level;
however, there may be some conditions or occa-
sions when it is useful to collect individualised
data at the international level.
Recent events have demonstrated the likelihood
of continual threats of new infectious disease
events. This is further complicated by the increas-
ingly complex nature of the world, with expansion
in international trade and travel. Surveillancemust
be appropriate for the population at risk. An
outbreak related to an internationally traded food-
stuff, or a conference of international travellers,
raises complex issues of identifying the at-risk
population, as well as issues of international
collaboration, data exchange, ethics and lawwhich
would not apply to an outbreak resulting from a
problem in a village shop.
Surveillance increasingly takes place in the full
glare of the media and the scrutiny of public
opinion. Any outbreak is seen as a failure, and
public expectations of being protected from infec-
tion may be unrealistic. Just as surveillance must
be linked to control, it should also inform public
education and information.
SENSITIVITY OF SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEMS
Surveillance systems, like any other detection
system, can be examined from the point of view
of their sensitivity and speciﬁcity, and the likeli-
hood of false-positives and false-negatives being
declared. A system can be made more sensitive,
but with the concomitant problem that the false-
positive rate is likely to rise. The appropriate
sensitivity and speciﬁcity of a surveillance system
depend upon its purpose.
An early-warning system for severe events
might reasonably be designed to be sensitive, in
which case systems must be put in place to
manage the problem that will arise from identi-
fying events that turn out to be false-positives.
This means having access to rapid conﬁrmatory
tests or investigations, and the ability to manage
the public and political anxieties that may be
generated. The alternative model, which aims to
avoid false-positives, runs the risk of missing real
events, or delaying their identiﬁcation.
A mature surveillance system, with speciﬁc
laboratory tests, can be highly speciﬁc. It should
also be remembered that the predictive power of a
test (and a surveillance system can be considered
a complex test) depends upon the prevalence of
the condition in the population. Thus, when
measles was common, clinical diagnosis of mea-
sles was useful as a surveillance tool. As measles
has become less common, although the sensitivity
and speciﬁcity of clinical diagnosis are
unchanged, the false-positive rate has become
unacceptable, and surveillance systems have been
obliged to adopt more speciﬁc laboratory tools.
Surveillance systems should be developed
with due consideration being paid to the popu-
lation(s) at risk, their link to control ⁄prevention
measures, the appropriate sensitivity ⁄ speciﬁcity
and the management of public expectations. Aids
such as the ‘critical examination technique’
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(Table 1) can be used to investigate a surveillance
system and optimise its various components.
IMPROVING SURVEILLANCE
Improving surveillance systems involves ensur-
ing the use of methods with the appropriate
sensitivity and speciﬁcity for the outputs desired.
It is not an improvement to increase the speciﬁcity
for an early-warning system if this introduces
unacceptable delays. There is no single model; the
system must be ﬁt for its purpose.
Infectious disease events can be considered
graphically according to two axes, namely, pre-
dictable or unpredictable, known or unknown.
Thus, there are the unpredictable and unknown,
such as the outbreak of severe acute respiratory
syndrome or vCJD, the predictable and known,
such as measles outbreaks when vaccination rates
drop, and the unpredictable and known, such as
the possibility of food poisoning outbreaks
related to large-scale catering events, without
knowing where or when. Surveillance systems
for a known and predictable event must be very
different from those required for an unknown and
unpredictable event. As knowledge matures and
a condition moves from being unknown to
known, the surveillance system must change with
it. Indeed, one of the roles of surveillance is to
help move understanding from the unknown and
unpredictable to the known and predictable.
Better understanding of the epidemiology and
basic mechanisms of infection enables surveil-
lance to be better targeted to at-risk populations.
Targeted surveillance (and targeting may be of
whole populations) should enable better, more
complete ascertainment of that which can be
considered a case and that which should not.
New methods such as the use of mathematical
modelling and geographical information systems
support conventional surveillance in moving
events into the known and predictable category.
Novel data sources may also be useful in
improving ascertainment and understanding,
and therefore providing better-quality data sets.
Sales of over-the-counter remedies, perhaps
tracked through customer loyalty cards, may be
rich sources of information about ‘coughs and
colds’ and could be used to provide early warning
of upper respiratory tract infection. Calls to health
advice lines can be used in a similar manner.
Information about weather patterns and veterin-
ary events can indicate the risk of human disease
such as Rift Valley fever and West Nile fever.
Current surveillance systems are reliable in
detecting signiﬁcant events that are localised in
time and space, e.g., point source food poisoning.
However, it ismuchmore difﬁcult to detect diffuse
and progressive events with a slow increase in
incidence over time, or sporadic and widespread
events where there may not be any obvious links
among time, place or person. Detection of these
events relies on good data collection, good back-
ground data for comparative purposes and sophis-
ticated analytical tools that will provide alerts
when meaningful changes from a baseline occur.
CONCLUSION
The key to all these improvements in surveillance
is developing the workforce. Surveillance is
dependent on access to individuals with a broad
range of skills: clinical, epidemiological, anthro-
pological, and mathematical. In particular, people
who can think laterally and are not constrained to
think merely within the known ‘boxes’ are
needed. They must be encouraged through effect-
ive training courses, good mentorship and net-
working, and clear career structures.
Table 1. Critical examination technique
Purpose What is achieved? Is it necessary and why? What else could be done? What should be done?
Place Where is it done? Why there? Where else could it be done? Where should it be done?
Sequence When is it done? Why then? When else could it be done? When should it be done?
Person Who does it? Why that person? Who else could do it? Who should do it?
Means How is it done? Why that way? How else could it be done? How should it be done?
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